In general, A cannot successfully employ a deceptive strategy against B if B knows A's intention and plan. Mele then describes the "dynamic/strategy" paradox: Thus, A must simultaneously believe that p is false and believe that p is true.
So when A deceives A (i.e., himself) into believing that p is true, he knows or truly believes that p is false while causing himself to believe that p is true. If ever a person A deceives a person B into believing that something, p, is true, A knows or truly believes that p is false while causing B to believe that p is true. Mele formulates an example of the "static" paradox as the following: Two of these paradoxes include the self-deceiver's state of mind and the dynamics of self-deception, coined the "static" paradox and the "dynamic/strategic" paradox, respectively. Mele have provided insight into some of the more prominent paradoxes regarding self-deception. In contrast, rationalization alone cannot effectively clarify the dynamics of self-deception, as reason is just one adaptive form mental processes can take. Such rationalization can be manipulated in both positive and negative fashions convincing one to perceive a negative situation optimistically and vice versa. However, rationalization is influenced by myriad factors, including socialization, personal biases, fear, and cognitive repression. Irrationality is the foundation from which the argued paradoxes of self-deception stem, and it is argued that not everyone has the "special talents" and capacities for self-deception. Self-deception calls into question the nature of the individual, specifically in a psychological context and the nature of "self". No deceitful intention is required for this. When a person, who disbelieves p, intentionally tries to make himself believe or continue believing p by engaging in such activities, and, as a result unintentionally misleads himself into believing or continuing to believe p via biased thinking, he deceives himself in a way appropriate for self-deception. Brian McLaughlin illustrates that such rationalizations in certain circumstances permit the phenomenon. The process of rationalization, however, can obscure the intent of self-deception. On this traditional mode, self-deceivers must (1) hold contradictory beliefs and (2) intentionally get themselves to hold a belief they know or believe truly to be false. Such deception is intentional and requires the deceiver to know or believe ¬ p and the deceived to believe p. The traditional paradigm of self-deception is modeled after interpersonal deception, where A intentionally gets B to believe some proposition p, all the while knowing or believing truly ¬ p (not p).
Later, the focus has been shifted to vision-related research in social psychology. The lack of mechanistic models available to this line of research, led to the debate being unresolved. While Freudian analysis of the conscious and the unconscious minds dominated the field, psychological scientists in the 1970s became curious about how those two seemingly separate worlds could work together. Self-deception involves convincing oneself of a truth (or lack of truth) so that one does not reveal any self-knowledge of the deception. Self-deception is a process of denying or rationalizing away the relevance, significance, or importance of opposing evidence and logical argument.
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